

TEACHING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

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PART III, LESSON FIVE: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

Teaching Strategy

This Lesson could well be the most creative of all. It requires students to think in analytical terms. They should realize two things: First, objective conditions (such as population ratios) set parameters within which politics operate, and drive societies towards certain outcomes. Second, they should realize that no outcome is deterministic. Nothing *has* to happen.

1. Review the facts: population figures and ratios, the regions of geographic Palestine including the Occupied Territories, and where Palestinians live.
2. Tell students that this is where they put on their thinking caps. Emphasize that they are being asked to do a difficult task, to analyze the facts without letting their own personal feelings get in the way. In other words they are not to discuss what they want, but are to understand the points of view of the various parties in the dispute.
3. There are three ways to approach this material. All are worth doing. You have to decide which is best. The first is to discuss why the alternatives might or might not occur. The second is to focus upon how specific families might react to the alternatives. The third is to address the ethical dimension. Below are alternate ways to address these issues.
 1. Break student into five groups. Ask them to generate a list of reasons why this outcome might occur or might not occur. (Below are a list of reasons which you can use to help them with the points they may miss).
 2. Break into five groups. Within a group break into A, B, and C sub-groups. A's will argue for the option, B's against it, C's will judge who makes the best case. Teams take 15 minutes to decide on what basis they will make their decision and what information they will need to look at. Discussions may take place simultaneously in different parts of the room, or sequentially in front of the class.
 3. Ask students to draw a teeter-totter with the arguments for and against each outcome on opposite sides. Which option has the most weight on the "for" side?
 4. Ask students to think once again of the six Israeli and six Palestinian families encountered earlier. Break students into twelve groups, one for each family. Ask them to discuss how their family would react to each outcome. Which would the family want? After the discussion, have each team choose someone to represent the family. Then do one or more of the following: 1. In turn, have the six Israeli and the six Palestinian families discuss their perspectives among themselves with rest of the class watching. 2. Have "visiting

delegations" of Israelis and Palestinians come to class, with the rest of the class interviewing them about their views and what they would like to see as the outcome. 3. Have a panel of Israeli and Palestinian families debate the issues among themselves, with the rest of the class watching. In all of these debates, emphasize to students that while some of the twelve families may show exceptional anger or even pursue extremist policies, all are real people who are acting as we might act if we were in their shoes. Try to humanize the deliberation process; push students away from caricature.

5. Following Student Question Seven (p. 81), ask students what they think American policy should be. Should we encourage any of these options, or resist any? Should we simply withdraw from the region, break all ties with all states, and allow history to take its course (whatever that is)? At present, we have a certain amount of leverage with Israel because of our foreign assistance (more than \$3.5 billion a year plus a \$10 billion subsidized loan guaranteed in 1992). Should we use this leverage? How? Which option would we favor if our foreign policy were rooted exclusively in a calculated effort to maintain and enhance American power in the region? Which would we favor if our foreign policy were rooted in a desire to promote justice? What do we mean by justice? What if power and justice are both included in our policy? Break students into sub-groups and ask them to come up with recommendations to the President.

Remember two things about these options:

1. They are conceptually defined. There may be more than five if we count permutations. For example, some Israelis have suggested giving Gaza independence and annexing the West Bank. Since these permutations do not avoid the basic problems, they are not treated as separate categories.
 2. Emphasize that all outcomes are improbable. None of these is likely (and yet *some* outcome *must* occur).
4. Student Question Eight (p. 82) might be a good final essay assignment.

THE COSTS OF EACH OUTCOME

These are some significant reasons why each of the outcomes listed is improbable or too costly. If students have trouble thinking of costs, you can help them with these.

Status quo: 1. Since Palestinians will not accept the status quo, this outcome means ongoing conflict, rising tension, constant Israeli mobilization, large military expenditures, and extended reserve duty for Israelis. 2. Since societies do not handle stress well we can anticipate increasing clashes between Jews in Israel, the rise of extremist Jewish parties, and the rise of extremist Palestinian groups. 3. There would be declining support for Israel in the US and other countries and constant condemnation of Israel in the UN. This would put strain on the US-Israeli relationship since the US would have to defend Israel from criticism. 4. The US would have to provide increasing financial assistance to Israel. 5. There is the danger of anti-Semitism if Jews are somehow blamed for tensions and wars the Middle East.

Unification: 1. It would mean full voting rights for all Palestinians, those being 36% of the population. 2. Unification would mean the elimination of the Zionist dream of a Jewish state. Most likely the major

opposition party in the new Israeli-Palestinian parliament would be the PLO, something most Israelis would never accept. 3. Most Palestinians would see this as a trick, would fear that the Israelis would not deal in good faith, and would resist. 4. The history of the conflict and the bad feelings that exist would make unification and cooperation an unrealistic option. 5. There would be great practical difficulties. For example what would be the name of the new state? What would be its language?

Two-State Solution: 1. There are over 200,000 Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories. Since all eligible settlers are in military reserve units, this means they could resist by force any arrangement they did not like. In the past, settler leaders have stated their intention to fight any effort to force them to live under Palestinian authority or to leave their settlements. 2. There are militant Palestinians who insist on a unified Palestine with majority rule. 3. The economies of the two regions have become so connected that separating them into two countries would create enormous problems. Both Israel and the Occupied Territories are small lands with imbalanced economies that are dependent upon each other. For example, Israel gets much of its water from aquifers and rainfall on the West Bank. Without Palestinian water, Israeli irrigation would have to be cut back (and certainly the Palestinian farmers would want to irrigate their own land with their own water, if they controlled it). Without some kind of ongoing linkage or outside financing, neither state would be economically viable. 4. Israel would fear that Palestine would become an enemy state. They would insist that the Palestinian state be demilitarized, thus leaving it vulnerable to attack by vigilante Jewish settlers and Arab neighbors. Would the Palestinian state accept these conditions?

Expulsion of the Palestinians: 1. Expulsion would send shock waves throughout the region and the international system. It would be such an affront to Arabs and Muslims that any government that remained neutral would face overthrow--either from mass demonstrations or from a coup. There would be a general mobilization of Arab states against Israel. 2. Expulsion would require that Israel crush Jordan in advance (since Jordan clearly would resist having a million Palestinians dumped into its country of 3.4 million). Knocking out Jordan would require also knocking out Syria and Iraq, since both share borders with Jordan and would come to Jordan's assistance. And if Syria and Iraq were defeated, Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be left alone to face the newly empowered Israeli army. Since all governments in the region would recognize these dangers, it is unlikely that any would remain passive. 3. The practical problems of expulsion are considerable. Palestinians are aware the many of them fled the fighting in 1948 thinking they would be able to come back later, only to discover they were forbidden to do so. They would resist deportation, meaning that Israel would have to use massive violence against innocent civilians to get them to go. 4. Expulsion would create tension between Israel and the United States. Since US interests are promoted by regional stability, destabilization would threaten those interests. US public opinion would probably be against Israel as would some Jewish opinion.

Elimination of Israel: 1. While there are 170 million Arabs, these are a diverse group that have never functioned in any unified way. Those in North Africa have their own political concerns and are peripheral to what is happening in Palestine. And in the past, even those Arab states bordering Israel have seldom been able to agree upon a common policy except at a very general ideological level. 2. Looking country by country, there is little threat: Egypt has a peace treaty with Israel, Lebanon is small and weak and has never had a strong army, Jordan is also small and is militarily weak, Saudi Arabia is distant and not a major military force, Iraq is distant and has been devastated by war, and Syria is no match for Israel. 3. The United States would act to protect Israel, something the Arab states know and would not want to confront. 4. Israel has nuclear weapons and would use them. The Arab states do not.

EXPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS

Rabbi Meir Kahane--who was assassinated in 1989 in New York--was widely denounced for his extremism. In 1984 he was elected to the Knesset, but in 1988 his party was banned for its extremist views (when polls showed he might win four or more seats, up from one). Today his views are no longer marginal. Two Knesset parties advocate some form of expulsion. The Molodet party calls for the expulsion of all of the nearly 2 million non-Israel Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and Tsomet would expel those living in refugee camps. Israeli public opinion polls show that up to 52% are willing to consider some form of expulsion (Smith Poll, 1992).

Often the advocates of expulsion use euphemisms to make their proposal sound more palatable. They speak of Population Exchanges by which they mean that in the past Jews came to Israel from Arab lands and now Palestinians can reasonably be sent into various Arab states. They often point to similar events in history. After World War I, Greeks and Turks were massacred and driven out of each other's country in an orgy of blood-letting and personal tragedy; also when India and Pakistan split apart, there were expulsions and massacres. These two examples are cited as precedent, often implying that they are normal and reasonable. Also, remember that the Peel report casually suggested expelling a quarter of a million Palestinians.

Since Jordan would be the primary recipient of expelled Palestinians the advocates of expulsion often say that "There is a Palestinian state: Jordan" or "We don't need a second Palestinian state." Advocates often hint that the Hashemite regime in Jordan would be deposed (by violence) and replaced with a Palestinian government that would receive the Palestinians. Former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon said "There is a Palestinian state. All that is needed is a headline." Presumably the headline would be "King Hussein dead. Arafat in Amman."

Most advocates of this position are from Likud or other rightist parties. They present pseudo-legal arguments based on the fact that the territory awarded to Britain included both historic Palestine (Israel and the Occupied Territories) AND Jordan, and that the British called the whole area Palestine. They say that since Palestine has ALREADY been partitioned, then by definition there is already a Palestinian state and the Palestinians should "go back" to it. In fact, the Mandate of 1922 specifically excluded Jordan. The "Jordan is Palestine" argument is not accepted by Jordanians, Palestinians, Americans, or the UN.

You might mention the board game Risk, in which the world is divided into regions, and players are assigned the task of conquering the world. Some students may have played this game and may know the logic of how rivals deal with emerging powers. What typically happens is that two players will form an alliance and agree not to attack each other for a fixed time, perhaps three turns. Then one will make a break-through and seem on the verge of mass conquest. At this point, the logic of self-survival always overrides the alliance and the threatened partner moves to attack its ally rather than see that ally emerge as an all-powerful player. A similar logic works in international relations. When your ally (or a country towards which you have been neutral) threatens to emerge as untouchable, you may join with previous enemies to prevent its rise. Thus the emergence of Israel as a threat to Jordan or Syria would bring Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other lesser players into the conflict on the side of those threatened Arab states (even if those Arab states had been rivals).

Many Arabs are afraid of the arrival of Russian Jews into Israel. Already several hundred thousand have arrived and there is a potential for up to another million to arrive. Palestinians (and neighboring Arabs) fear the logic of "one million in, one million out." At one point, Prime Minister Shamir said that a big population requires a big Israel. This frightened both Palestinians and Jordanians, and led Iraq to fear

that Israel might be planning a preemptive attack on it (since Iraq almost certainly would have come to the defense of Jordan). While most Israelis insist this is not a realistic fear, Palestinians and other Arabs remained worried.

There is no certain or "right" answer to the question of future outcomes. The purpose of the exercise is to make students think logically and systematically about how political systems work. There is a wall sign that says "Take what you want, said God, and pay for it." There is much that a powerful country can do, but the costs are often greater than the benefits. Try to get students to think in terms of costs and benefits of each option. Try to get them to think in terms of what US interests are and should be. And, lastly, ask them to think in terms of what they consider a "fair" solution. (This may involve defining what they mean by fair.)

BACKGROUND: NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

The Intifada and the Algiers meeting of the PNC changed the negotiation environment. As mentioned earlier, there is no intention to include current negotiating positions in this unit. However, for background informational purposes, it is helpful to know general orientations. In the Palestinian case, these are partially summarized in the section on the Political Program. Other positions and comments are summarized below. In the Israeli case, the task is more difficult because Israelis are polarized between the rightist Likud and center-left Labour. In 1989 Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin outlined their plans, called the Shamir Plan and the Rabin Plan. Some observers said they were similar, others saw them as quite distinct. Remember that these are all positions taken prior to the beginning of talks. Documents and policy statements relevant to the negotiations that began in Madrid in 1991 and subsequent to the 1992 election from all sides are reprinted in the Journal of Palestine Studies, available in university libraries.

Shamir Plan:

1. Israel wants peace based on direct negotiations between governments.
2. "Israel opposes the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza District and in the area between Israel and Jordan."
3. Israel will "not conduct negotiations with the PLO."
4. There will be "no change in the status of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza" other than in accordance with Israeli Guidelines.
5. There should be "comprehensive peace" with neighboring states, including trade and diplomatic normalization.
6. There should be an international effort to solve the problem of refugees in camps in the Territories. This would be separate from the negotiations.
7. There should be elections in the Territories to choose a Palestinian negotiating team.
8. There will be a five-year transition period of self-rule during which Palestinians will control "their affairs of daily life." This period will lead to normalization between Israel and Jordan and "the calming of the violence." This "test for co-existence and cooperation" would lead to negotiations on a permanent settlement but self-rule will continue "until the signing of an agreement for a permanent solution."
9. Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and elected representatives of the territories will participate in talks.
10. East Jerusalem is a part of Israel and residents of that city may not participate in the talks.
11. In negotiations over a permanent settlement Israel will claim sovereignty over the Territories.

Rabin Plan:

1. "Israeli policy cannot be based upon a single element: suppression (of the Intifada) alone." There must also be a political plan.
2. "Deadlock naturally causes an explosion." Time is not on Israel's side.
3. Jordan cannot credibly negotiate for the Palestinians. Only the PLO or "representatives from the residents of the Territories" can do this.
4. Peace on Israel's eastern

border must involve a political settlement with Jordan and the Palestinians. 5. There must be a two-phase settlement, Interim and Permanent. 6. There must be elections to choose "political representation" for the Palestinians. (This was before talks opened, and Rabin wanted a delegation that would be legitimate in the eyes of Palestinians but would exclude the PLO. In fact the delegation that went to Madrid was approved by the PLO and was top heavy with PLO members). 7. The Interim settlement would involve "expanded autonomy or administrative authority and self-rule" with "security matters in Israel's hands." The elected representatives would be the nucleus of the self-governing bodies created. 8. The Permanent Settlement would grow from negotiations between Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians, and perhaps Egyptians. It would produce either "partnership with Jordan, federative or other" or "federation of some kind with Israel." 9. The goals of these negotiations would be "comprehensive peace." 10. The settlement would be with the "residents living in the Territories" with the matter of the Palestinian refugees left until later.

The Palestinian Position:

1. Negotiation should be with the PLO, the recognized representative of the Palestinian people.
2. Elections should be under UN supervision to guarantee free outcomes.
3. There should be a freeze on Israeli settlements prior to negotiations.
4. Any solution should be comprehensive, meaning peace with all regional states and the end of Israeli occupation of Lebanese and Syrian land.
5. Any negotiation must recognize the Palestinians as a national people, not just as "residents" or "refugees."
6. Negotiations must be rooted in international legitimacy meaning UN Resolutions 181, 194, 242, and 336.
7. Negotiations must be under international supervision, involving the major powers on the Security Council, who would guarantee any settlement.
8. A phased settlement is acceptable if there is an integrated plan "whose beginning and end are stipulated in advance." In other words, there could be a period of autonomy if there is an agreement upon self-determination afterwards.
9. During the interim period, there should be Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and a UN force brought in to guarantee the settlement.
10. It is unrealistic to call for an end to the Intifada prior to talks. The cause of the Intifada is the occupation. When the occupation ends, the Intifada will end.

THE ISRAELI-PLO ACCORDS

On September 13, 1993 President Bill Clinton hosted a White House public signing of PLO-Israeli document that normalized relations between the Jewish Palestinian peoples. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed for the PLO and Foreign Minister Peres signed for Israel as Yitzhak Rabin watched. Arafat and Rabin shook hands, standing at the table upon which the Camp David Accords had been signed in 1978. It was a historic moment comparable to the first meeting of South African President F.W. de Klerk and African National Congress President Nelson Mandela.

The Declaration of Principles (commonly called Accords) provided for the setting up of a Palestinian government in Gaza and Jericho as the first step in a total normalization of relations between the two peoples. The Accords and other documents are included in the unit.

Three Surprises

Assessing historical events is always risky until time has passed, but these agreements seem to warrant such assessment. Since nobody predicted what would happen, we should comment upon what in retrospect was truly surprising and what was not.

First, it was *not* surprising that Israel agreed to withdraw from the Occupied Territories. Labor party leaders had been talking of this for two decades, given minor modifications of the pre-1967 border. Also, the stresses and costs of the Intifada were very high in both Israel and the Occupied Territories.

Nor was it surprising that Israel agreed to deal with the PLO. Mr. Shamir had agreed to this by going to Madrid for talks. And in 1993 when Israel allowed Faisal Husseini to head the Palestinian delegation, they accepted Arafat's closest ally in the Occupied Territories. Israel had long recognized that the PLO was the political body preferred by Palestinians.

What *was* surprising was that they agreed to meet Arafat and to acknowledge him and the PLO as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. Israel had always hoped to assemble a group of "national leaders" who would substitute for the PLO. They also hoped to avoid dealing directly with Arafat, who had been demonized over the years for various acts of violence linked to his organization. Agreeing to deal directly with Arafat and the PLO was a major decision. As Rabin said at the time, they realized that Arafat and the PLO were the only ones able to sign an agreement and deliver upon their promises. Arafat's version of Rabin's decision was quite similar: "He is a pragmatist."

Second, Israel seems to agree that there must be concessions on East Jerusalem. If correct, this is a major change in the Israeli position. It is discussed more fully below.

Third, a related issue is whether there will be a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem. The evidence points to yes. By creating a Palestinian parliament and a Palestinian police force, by declaring the West Bank and Gaza to be an integral whole, and by allowing Palestinians from East Jerusalem to vote in and be subject to the authority of the new Palestinian parliament, the agreement seems to suggest that a Palestinian state is on its way. Those on the Israeli right still insist that Israel agreed only to autonomy but in Washington, Foreign Minister Peres said that "we do not seek to shape your lives or determine your destiny...." Such a statement, when Palestinians overwhelmingly want a Palestinian state, points in only one direction.

Scenarios for Implementation

As we watch from the euphoric perspective of freshly-signed documents, we must realistically anticipate problems in implementation. There are Optimistic and Pessimistic scenarios for what could happen next. Difficulties emerge from ambiguities in the texts, the intentions of the parties, secret agreements, and the ability of officials to deliver and to overcome internal opposition. The Optimistic scenario is that the Accords will be implemented in such a way as to satisfy both parties enough to normalize relations between them, to end the occupation, and to stop the killing. A Pessimistic scenario means one side or the other will insist upon more than is reasonable, that internal opposition groups will gain the upper hand, or that extremist elements will be uncontrollable.

One less optimistic scenario is that the Israelis have in mind the Allon Plan or the 1970s as a reasonable outcome. This seems to be the fallback position of the Jewish right. The Allon plan provided that Gaza, the central highlands of the West Bank, and a corridor near Jericho would go to Jordan. Israel would annex Jerusalem and much of the rest. This would transfer most of the Palestinian population to Jordan but would leave much of the land with Israel. It would also leave the Palestinians without their own state. If this were the direction of talks then they could break down and the Intifada revive. The Allon plan is discussed below.

A second scenario talks could lead to a Palestinian state, most likely federated with Jordan. This appears to be the thrust of the agreement and the associated public statements. If so, it would satisfy most of the Palestinians clustered around Arafat, would meet international criteria for a settlement, would produce complete political separation of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, and would make possible future economic and political cooperation not only between Israel and Palestine but also with Jordan. In this scenario, Palestine would become a bridge between Israel and the Arab world.

Opposition to the Agreements

There are three types of opponents to the agreement. They exist in mirror image form on the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

Religious Elements may believe there is some holy mandate that contradicts the partition of the land. Some Jewish religious leaders believe it is inconsistent with the Torah to yield any land currently held by Israel. Others see Eretz Israel as including land beyond current boundaries into Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The Hamas charter says specifically that all of Palestine must be an Islamic state. Some (but not all) people holding such views are violent.

Pragmatic Skeptics may accept the principle of a negotiated settlement but believe the agreement is flawed, that it will not work, that it sold out too much. Israelis tend to say Arafat cannot deliver, that certain security issues are at stake, that Palestinian extremists might control the council, that there should never be a Palestinian state. Palestinians fear that the Israelis will never yield much more than they have already yielded, that the refugees will be forgotten, that there will be no Palestinian state, and that the Palestinian entity will be so weak and vulnerable that it will not work and will not bring peace. There are also many who fear Resolution 194 will not be honored and that those who want to return to their homes in Haifa or elsewhere inside Israel itself will not be allowed to do so.

The Extremist Factions are definitely present. Abu Nidal is a Palestinian renegade who has tried to kill Arafat over the decades and will try again. Other radical elements (Abu Musa's Fatah Uprising and Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC) are also there. On the Israeli side, the Jewish Underground of the early 1980's tried to blow up the Islamic Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and were stopped by police as they entered the site with explosives. Various settler groups have threatened to declare an independent Jewish state in the Occupied Territories and have received public encouragement from military leaders such as Ariel Sharon. Some Israelis fear there is a potential for violence and civil war.

On the Palestinian side, some of the strongest opponents of the agreements are in exile in Lebanon or Jordan or Syria. Within the territories, Hamas and others are capable of causing damage. The Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories are also a threat. Settlers as a class have historically tended to violently oppose decisions that leave them under the authority of native populations. The French in Algeria and the whites in Rhodesia are relevant examples (if not entirely parallel cases). Both led uprisings against their own government. Israelis are hoping that the announcement of a phased settlement will defuse a settler rebellion. They anticipate a drop in settlement property values, a movement of settlers back into Israel, and a weakened ability of settler extremists to do more than protest. The settlers are wild card. They are armed and organized.

The Arab States: There is minimal opposition from the Arab states, mostly comments that they

believe the PLO could have gotten a better deal, or that Arafat should have consulted with other Arab leaders. The Jordanians were most distressed, out of concern that they would be left with the several hundred thousand Palestinians living in refugee camps.

An Assessment: There is no reason to believe that killing and other violence will decline in the short term. Assassinations and attacks on civilians by Israelis and Palestinians will continue as extremist elements maneuver for position. Both sides want to maximize their gains and fear that the other side is not negotiating in good faith. Settlers will try to resist a complete pull-out, Palestinians will keep pressure on Israeli forces and populations to withdraw. On both sides, there is evidence that resistance will remain within parameters. The PLO has worked out agreements with Hamas and its leftist opposition to create a new coordinating council, to refrain from attacks upon each other, and to express disagreements in non-military ways. On the Jewish side, there is also an effort to rally behind the flag, with vigorous dissent being expressed but signs that opposition will be within certain non-violent parameters. Both national peoples have a sense that they are threatened and vulnerable and must hang together to prevent further disaster. This will serve to inhibit attacks which might completely undermine authority.

What Do the Accords Provide?

Palestine Government: There will be a Palestinian government with an initial base in Gaza and Jericho, but with authority over the whole of Gaza and the West Bank, (with specified exceptions). Most observers have said the document speaks of the city of Jericho but in fact it refers to "the Jericho area," which may mean the larger Jericho district even in the first phase.

Palestine Council: This government will be headed by an elected council, effectively a parliament, to be chosen in July, 1994 in a free election monitored by an international observers. The document says that "In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will insure public order." The election proposal of the Shamir government did not provide for international supervision or withdrawal of Israeli troops.

Unitary Integrity of the Occupied Territories: The Accords view the West Bank and Gaza as "a single territorial unit". This is a significant statement that puts the whole of the area under the ultimate authority of the Palestinian government. The agreement also states that the "jurisdiction of the Council will cover the West Bank and Gaza," again affirming their unity.

Israeli Military Withdrawal: Israeli troops will soon withdraw from populated areas to specified outposts. Foreign forces will be brought in during the transition period. Confrontations between soldiers and Palestinian youth that occur daily and produce death and injury should drop.

Strong Police Force: Some things are too difficult to concede early on. One of them is the idea of a Palestinian army. The document provides for a Palestinian police force but specifies that it will be a "strong" force. One thinks of Japan which is constitutionally prohibited from having an army but which has the only police force in the world with a navy.

Transition Period: There will be a period up to five years before final status and the transition to Palestinian rule is complete. Further negotiations begin immediately. After two or three years an advanced stage will commence. Details of what these stages mean are vague except they lead to a final agreement.

Future Negotiations Based on Resolutions 242 and 338: The document says "It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." The earlier negotiating position of the PLO was that they would agree to an interim accord if it were the first step towards an ultimate outcome. Most likely, PLO negotiators felt this was achieved. Also note force is inadmissible. Full literal implementation of 242 would require full Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. This seems unlikely, although it remains the PLO position.

Limits on Council Authority: For the time being, the Palestinian Council will have no authority over Israeli military positions, Jewish settlements, Israelis in the Occupied Territories for any reason, and East Jerusalem. The document says "Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis." Also during the transition period "Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis."

Jerusalem: Including Jerusalem on the agenda was predictable and necessary but shocking to some Israelis. As mentioned elsewhere, there are at least five separate Jerusalems, some clearly Jewish, some traditionally Palestinian. Israel had earlier put Jerusalem on the table by allowing Faisal Husseini, a Jerusalem resident, to participate in the talks. Shamir had earlier insisted that to allow Jerusalem residents on the Palestinian team would acknowledge that Jerusalem was Palestinian. Almost all Israelis consider Jerusalem in its current entirety to be Israeli. Rabin repeated over and over again the Israeli phrase that Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Jewish people and that it will remain forever united and under Israeli sovereignty. But the original letter of agreement that began the Madrid talks, and the Accords themselves emphasized that the implementation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 were the goal of the talks. And these resolutions specified that the acquisition of territory by force was inadmissible. Rabin's emphatic assertion in Washington before the signing was that if Arafat wanted Jerusalem he should "forget it." But as Arafat said, "He is talking of Jewish Jerusalem, not Arab Jerusalem," i.e., West not East.

The election provisions specify that Palestinians living in Jerusalem vote for the Palestinian council. Including them under the authority of the council clearly classifies them as Palestinian rather than Israeli. Israeli law in fact never considered them citizens, although it gave them residency rights.

Quite possibly, there will be a mix of sovereignties. A good optimistic guess might be East Jerusalem to Palestine, West Jerusalem to Israel, a condominium over the Ancient City, and certain Jewish settlements under Palestinian sovereignty but with special status. There has also been talk of swaps of towns, perhaps Maale Adumim to Israel and Um Al Fahm to Palestine.

Refugees: Many Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria were bitterly disappointed that there was no specific reference to the right of refugees to return, especially the refugees of 1948. Jordan was also upset that this was not included in the Accords, since they fear being left with camp refugees who are not fully integrated into Jordanian society. The document says that Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the PLO will establish a committee to regulate return of 1967 refugees. The subject of the 1948 refugees is held for later discussion.

Possible Areas of Cooperation: High among areas of future cooperation are water resources. This is a critical area where all parties have interests. The document refers to "management of water resources" and "water rights," and "equitable utilization of water resources" as topics for

discussion.

Mediterranean Sea - Dead Sea Canal: The Dead Sea is drying up. Some decades ago there was a proposal to drain water from the Mediterranean into the Dead Sea to revive it. Ecologists were horrified and Israel dropped the plan. There has been recent talk of reviving it. It is mentioned in the Accord.

Topic of Discussion: Permanent status negotiations will include "Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest."

A Note on Terminology: Throughout this unit there has been an effort to use neutral terminology, following official US government practice wherever possible. This we write of Occupied Territories rather than Palestinian territories (preferred by Arabs) or Disputed or Administered Territories (preferred by Jews). After September, 1993 it seems logical to refer to the Palestinian territories or even to Palestine.

The Israeli-Jordanian Agenda

The day after Israel and the PLO signed their document, Jordan and Israel signed a document of their own, modestly called an Agenda. It had been worked out the previous October but Jordan had declined to sign lest it appear to betray other Arab parties. (Sadat had worked out a separate settlement at Camp David, leaving other Arab parties out in the cold. This had earned him the name of traitor. Jordan was not willing to do this.)

Among the provisions of the Agenda were the following:

Negotiations: Negotiations will be on the basis of "242 and 338 in all their aspects." Arafat used almost this exact term during the Washington signing.

Non conventional Weapons: There is a "mutual commitment" not to threaten or to use weapons against each other "including conventional and non conventional mass destruction weapons." Since Jordan has no such weapons, this is clearly a reference to Israel's nuclear arsenal. Arab states are concerned that Israel could use those weapons. Israel commits itself not to do so. There is also a commitment to "work towards a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, conventional and non conventional weapons."

Refugees: There is a commitment to resolve the refugee situation "in accordance with international law." Presumably Resolution 194 would be one primary consideration.

Boundaries: Jordan reaffirms what it stated in 1988: that it does not claim any part of the West Bank as Jordanian territory. Israel affirms that it claims no land beyond the Jordan river. The Agenda does not define Israel's eastern border except that it does not include current Jordanian territory.

Water: Water is on the Agenda, specifically "rightful water shares" and "ways to alleviate water shortages." In Amman, homes get water two days a week and must haul water at other times.

THE ALLON PLAN

Yigael Allon was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs before his death in 1980. As a Labor party leader, he advocated what was called the Allon Plan. The plan was based upon two assumptions. First, that Israel had security needs and should annex parts of the occupied territories. Second, that Israel should remain a Jewish state based in democratic principles and this meant releasing most of the Palestinians brought under its control in 1967. Allon's proposal was that the densely populated areas of the West Bank be returned to Jordan to create a Jordan-Palestine state. He originally proposed that Gaza be annexed (without its refugees) but later included Gaza among the areas to be transferred. Most of Sinai would be returned to Egypt except Sharm-el-Sheikh and Rafah near Gaza. Most of Syria's Golan province would be kept by Israel, which would also retain most of the Jordan Valley, the Rift escarpment above the valley, East Jerusalem, and the Gush Etzion area around Hebron.

In an article in *Foreign Affairs* ("Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," October 1976), Allon outlined certain "strategic security principles" that were the basis of the plan. In presenting these, he assumed that among Arabs there were "more extreme elements" and "other elements." "All other things considered, it is in strengthening these latter elements to the extent that they become decisive in the Arab world that the best chance lies to achieve compromise and reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states..." Israel would withdraw from "territories" occupied in 1967 if the new borders provided an "essential minimum of security" with "minimal strategic depth."

In Jerusalem there could be self-regulation of the holy sites and "it might be possible to base the municipal structure of the city upon subdistricts that take ethnic and religious criteria into account." Gaza would be linked to the West Bank with a "land route" (not a corridor). There would be a "selective settlement policy" in the newly annexed areas but Israel would "forfeit the densely populated heartland of Judea and Samaria." The returned areas would be demilitarized. The plan was logically linked to Allon's Jericho Plan of 1974 which proposed returning Jericho to Jordan as a first step.

Allon observed that "one does not have to be a military expert to easily identify the critical defects of the armistice lines that existed until June 4, 1967. A considerable part of these lines is without any topographical security value; and, of no less importance, the lines fail to provide Israel with the essential minimum of strategic depth. The gravest problem is on the eastern boundary, where the entire width of the coastal plain varies between 10 and 15 miles, where the main centers of Israel's population, including Tel Aviv and its suburbs, are situated, and where the situation of Jerusalem is especially perilous. Within these lines a single successful first strike by the Arab armies would be sufficient to dissect Israel at more than one point, to sever its essential living arteries, and to confront it with dangers that no other state would be prepared to face. The purpose of defensible borders is thus to correct this weakness, to provide Israel with the requisite minimal strategic depth, as well as lines which have topographical strategic significance."

The arguments of the Allon Plan were revived in the wake of the 1993 Accords. Israelis with doubts about the Accords considered it a fallback position that would maintain Israeli control of key territories. Many Palestinians also fear that this is the intention of the Rabin government and that Israel had not shifted from the thinking of the 1970s. The Allon Plan would not allow for a Palestinian state, would put Palestinians under Jordanian authority, and would transfer key parts of Palestinian territory to Israel.

It is always risky to make projections but it seems likely that Israeli elements will call for

implementing the 1993 Accords by some kind of Palestinian autonomy under a modified Allon Plan. One cannot see how such an outcome would solve the problem. If implemented, it most likely would produce either a breakdown of talks or a discrediting of the Palestinian leadership, a revival of the Intifada, and a renewal of the violence and political instability that characterized the years before the Accords. The objective conditions of the conflict--specifically the ability of the Palestinians under occupation to resist--has so changed reality that the Allon Plan no longer seems viable or relevant.

The Religious Significance of Jerusalem

Jews:

Jerusalem was a city before the Hebrews arrived. Moses, the greatest Hebrew prophet, was denied by God the right to visit it. David chose it as his capital because it was neutral vis-à-vis the squabbling of Hebrew tribes. Solomon built his temple there but after his reign the ten northern tribes seceded and moved their capital elsewhere. The northern and southern kingdoms were destroyed as was the first temple. It was rebuilt by Herod and was again destroyed by the Romans. By the second century, the focus of Judaism shifted away from the temple into the diaspora, but for over two millennia Jerusalem has remained a symbol of a people hunted and endangered. The remaining support wall of the second temple is today a pilgrimage site for Jews and is called the Western Wall. Some religious Jews look to a time when the temple will be rebuilt on its ancient site where the Dome of the Rock stands today.

Christians:

Early Christianity did not see Jerusalem as significant. Jesus put his focus on the kingdom of God, not a place. During his lifetime, he predicted the destruction of the temple. His final command to his disciples de-emphasized even the land itself: "Go forth into the world and baptize the nations..." Still, Jesus spent part of his life in Jerusalem, had his adult ceremony in the temple, was crucified, buried, and resurrected there. Christians later received Jerusalem as a focus of faith. In Madaba, Jordan, a sixth-century Christian map shows it as the center of the world. For centuries it has been the focus of pilgrimages, and European crusaders fought for nearly two hundred years to control it. To many Christians (especially Evangelicals) it will be the focus of the Final Days and the return of Christ. The Vatican also sees it as a special place to be protected from domination by any one religion.

Muslims:

Mohammed spent most of his life in Arabia. As a young man, he visited Syria but never Jerusalem until after God began to send him revelations. Then one night a divine event occurred. God put him on a winged animal, Al Buraq (traditionally called a horse), and flew to Jerusalem. This is the famous Nocturnal Journey described in the Koran (17:1): "Glory to God Who did take his Servant for a Journey by night From the Sacred Mosque To the Farthest Mosque Whose precincts We did Bless--in order that We Might show him some of Our Signs." Mohammed tethered the horse at the base of the mount near what Jews call the Western Wall. Muslims call the open area below the mount Al Buraq.

In Jerusalem, Mohammed climbed a mysterious ladder of light that took him into heaven where he

experienced the presence of God and was told that believers should pray five times a day facing Jerusalem. A later revelation said to pray facing Mecca, but Muslims still call Jerusalem "the first Qibleh (direction of prayer) and the third holiest site" (after Mecca and Medina).

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